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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
JAMES ORVILLE WOODWARD,
GLEN WOODWARD, THELMA
DALTON and JOYCE DICKASON,
Plaintiffs-Respondents,

i
Case No.

11593

vs.
BESSIE MONSON,
Defendant-Appellant. \
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

POINT I
IDAHO LAW IS APPLICABLE TO THE ISSUES IN
THIS CASE.
POINT II
UNDER IDAHO LAW DEFENDANT CLEARLY HAS
THE BURDEN OF GOING FORWARD WITH THE EVIDENCE AND PROVING ALL OF THE ELEMENTS OF A
GIFT, EXCEPTING IRREVOCABLE DELIVERY, BY CLEAR
AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE.
POINT III
THE JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT IS CLEARLY
SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE.
POINT IV
IT IS THE DUTY OF THE SUPREME COURT TO REVIEW THE EVIDENCE IN THE LIGHT MOST FAVORABLE
TO THE FINDINGS, AND THEY l\'IUST BE ALLOWED TO
STAND IF REASONABLE MINDS COULD AGREE WITH
THEM.
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STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF CASE
Plaintiffs and defendant are all of the heirs
at law of one James Leon \Voodward, deceased. During the lifetirne of James Leon \Voodward, he plac:::d
defendant-appellant Bessie lVIonson on a joint bank
account with him which he maintained in the First
Security Bank in Preston, Idaho. Following the death
of Jam es Leon Woodward, Bessie Monson, defendant-appellant, withdrevv the funds and claimed
them as her own. This is an action brought by plaintiffs against defendant by which they seek to recover their fair distributive share of the said joint
bank account.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
This action was commenced in the District
Court of Weber County. On January 15, 1969 it was
tried be:fo1·e the Honorable John F. \Vahlquist, sitting without a jury. Judgment was rendered in favoi·
of Jam es Orville Woodward against defendant Bessie
Monson in the sum of $2,599.93, judgment was rendered in favor of Glen Woodward and against dE:fendant Bessie Monson in the sum of $1,335.93,
judgment was rendered in favor of Thelma Dalton
and against defendant Bessie Monson in the sum of
$1,335.93, and judgment was rendered in favor of
Joyce Dickason against defendant Bessie I\1onson
in the sum of $1,335.93. Plaintiffs were also awarded costs in the amount of $18.20.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondents are not entirely in agreement with
appellant's statement of facts, and therefore re-state
facts pertinent to the issues before the Supreme
Court of the State of Utah on appeal.
UNDISPUTED FACTS
The following facts do not appear to be in dispute, inasmuch as they are stated in appellant's
statement of facts: Plaintiffs-respondents and defendant-appellant are the sole surviving children of
Jam es Leon W codward, who died a single man, and
intestate, on August 31, 1964. Prior to his death,
Jam es Leon Woodward owned a farm in the State
of Idaho near Preston, Idaho. James Leon Woodward maintained his personal savings account in the
First Security Bank of Preston, Idaho. During the
summer of 1963 he went to Ogden, Utah, and had
defendant-appellant Bessie Monson, sign a form required by the bank for creating a joint bank account
in the names of James Leon \Voodward and Bessie
Menson. Funds in the bank account represented primarily if not entirely proceeds from the sale of farm
land previously owned by Jam es Leon Woodward.
At the time of the death of James Leon Woodward funds in the amount of $12,500.00 were on deposit in the First Security Bank of Preston, Idaho.
Following the death of James Leon Woodward, defendant-appellant Bessie Monson transferred the
funds from the First Security Bank of Preston,
3

Idaho to the Bank of Ben Lomond in Ogden, Utah
in an account she had set up in her own name. From
these funds she paid certain expenses of last illness
and burial of James Leon Woodward. She paid the
sum of $1,000.00 to her mother, Safrona Woodward,
the divorced wife of James Leon Woodward, and
paid the additional sum of $1,000.00 to each of the
plaintiffs-respondents, with the exception of James
Orville Woodward. She did not pay any sums whatsoever to James Orville Woodward.
DISPUTED FACTS
The following facts are either in dispute, or
were not mentioned in appellant's statement of facts:
During his lifetime, James Leon Woodward lived
on a farm owned by him in Idaho neai· Preston,
Idaho, approximately nine months out of the year.
The farm consisted of about 100 acres ( T-51). He
spent approximately three months, the winter
months, in Ogden, Utah, in a rented apartment. He
came to Ogden, Utah on weekends during the spring,
summer and fall months, from time to time. (T-12,
T-14, T-15, T-67).
James Leon Woodward sold a portion of his
farm, and placed the proceeds resulting therefrom
in a bank account in the First Security Bank in
Preston, Idaho ( T-55, T-56).
During the summer of 1963 James Leon Woodward told defendant Bessie Monson that he had a
card for her to sign. He said, "I want you to sign
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this so if anything happens to me you can take care
of my burial and draw the money out and take care
of my burial." ( T-56, T-57) He gave defendant-appellant Bessie Monson no further instructions and
'
said nothing further to her about the account. (T-56,
T-57) This was the only conversation defendantappellant Bessie Monson ever had with her father
concerning the joint account. ( T-74)
Jam es Leon Woodward did not deliver possession of the pass book to Bessie Monson during his
lifetime. ( T-58, 'f-68) During the lifetime of Jam es
Leon Woodward, defendant-appellant Bessie Monson made no withdrawals from the joint account.
( T-69) She had no intention of making any withd1·awal from the account during his lifetime. (T-69)
She made no deposits to the account during the lifetime of James Leon vv oodward. During the lifetime
of Jam es Leon \Voodward Bessie Monson did not
feel th2.t the account, or the funds contained therein,
belonged to her at all. ( T-69) James Leon Woodward
never told defendant-appellant Bessie Monson that
he gave her the account or the money in it. ( T-69)
Bessie Monson did not feel that the funds in the bank
account belonged to her until after the death of
James Leon Woodward. (T-75)
Just prior to his confinement in the hospital
during his last illness, Jam es Leon Woodward spent
several days with Bessie Monson at her home in
Ogden, Utah. (T-64) He was admitted to the hos-

pital on August 29, 1964 and died on August 31,
1964. (T-64) He was admitted on Friday, and died
the following Sunday. (T-64)
Thelma Dalton one of the plaintiffs-respondents
herein was not fully advised of the seriousness of the
last confinement. On Sunday, her mother notified
her that her brother Glen Dalton and his wife had
gone to Ogden, and that James Jeon Woodward was
in the hospital. ( T-84) James Orville Woodward
was not notified of his fa the rs last illness until after
his father had passed away. (T-137) By that time
his father's body had already been removed to Preston, Idaho. (T-137) Due to the entire set of circumstances surrounding the death of his father and the
lack of notification, James Orville Woodward became too sick and nervous to go to the funeral. ( T138, T-139) Thelma Dalton was unable to attend
the funeral due to car trouble. ( T-84)
James Orville Woodward lived with his father
for two winters in Ogden prior to the time his father
died. On one occasion he lived with his father during
the winter months in Ogden about four years before
he died, and Oil another occasion he spent the winter
months with him about two years before the death
of James Leon Woodward, his father. ( T-135)
Prior to his death, James Leon Woodward had
told Thelma Dalton that he had money for her.
(T-86)
Following the death of James Leon Woodward
defendant-appellant Bessie Monson went to the home
6

and residence of Jam es Leon Woodward in Idaho,
and removed all of the papers nad documents pertaining to the sale of the farm property by James Leon
vVoodward and the bank account. ( T-129)
Following removal of these documents and
papers from the farmhouse, her brothers and sisters,
plaintiffs-respondents herein, inquired of Bessie
Monson defendant-appellant, what had become of the
farm. They inquired of Bessie Monson about funds
which they felt their father would have had if the
farm had been sold. Although Bessie Monson had the
papers relating to the sale of the farm and surrounding the transaction in her possession at that time, she
told her brothers and sisters that she didn't know
anything about it. (T-131)
Defendant-appellant Bessie Monson admitted
during the course of the trial that her brother Glen
Woodward, one of the plaintiffs-respondents herein,
asked her about the farm, whether it had been sold,
where the proceeds of the farm went, and that she
told him she didn't know at a time when she very
well knew. She admitted that her answer to her
brother was not entirely truthful. (T-70) She further admitted that she told her sister, Thelma Dalon, one of the plaintiffs-respondents herein, that she
didn't know where the proceeds from the sale of the
farm were at a time when she well knew where the
proceeds were, and further admitted that her statements to her sister Thelma Dalton were not entirely
truthful. (T-70)
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Following the f une1·al Bessie Monson told her
brother Glen Woodward that she did not know what
had happened to the proceeds from the sale of their
father's farm. (T-111, T-109)
On the Tuesday following the funeral, Thelma
Dalton went to visit her father's grave, and upon
returning stopped at the residence of Bessie Monson
in Ogden, Utah. (T-85) Mrs. Dalton inquired of
Bessie Monson where her father's money was, and
explained that a year earlier Jam es Leon Woodward
had promised Thelma Dalton that there was money
available for her. (T-86) Bessie Monson said there
wasn't going to be any money left. ( T-86)
ARGUMENT
POINT I
IDAHO LAW IS APPLICABLE TO THE ISSUES IN
THIS CASE.

It is conceded in this case that the questioned
bank account was maintained in the First Security
Bank of Preston, Idaho in Preston, Idaho. The deceased James Leon Woodward maintained a 100acre farm in Idaho, near Preston, Idaho, for some
years. In his later years a portion of it was sold,
and he maintained a smaller farm together with a
home in Idaho near Preston, Idaho. He spent approximately nine months out of the year in Idaho
on his farm property. He maintained his personal
affects and papers at his farmhouse in Idaho.

In 10 Am. Jur. 2d, Banks § 376 ( 1963) it is
stated:
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"It seems to be agreed that title to and
rights in a bank deposit standing in the names
of the depositor "and" another or the depositor "or" another is govErnecl by the law of the
place where the deposit has been made and
the account is kept.' This general rule has
been applied to deposits in the names of
spouses, both in cases in which the spouses
were, and in those in which they were not,
residents of the state in which the deposit
was made.
1

1

Where persons in a foreign country voluntarily transferred money to a New York
bank for deposit in a joint and survivorship
account, the account was upheld under the
New York law as such, even though it would
have been invalid under the foreign law. 5 "
The law of the jurisdiction where a banK account is
maintained is controlling.
Appellant argues that Utah substantive law
should have been controlling in this case upon the
theory that when Bessie Monson signed a bank signature card in Utah, the last act had been performed
which created a three-party contract and set up a
joint bank account in the First Security Bank in
Preston, Idaho. Query, if the signature card had
never been delivered to the First Security Bank in
Preston, Idaho, would a joint account have been
created? Obviously not. The last acts necessary for
the completion of the contract, even under defendant's theory, would have been the delivery of the
bank signature card, duly executed, to the First Security Bank at Preston, Idaho, together with the
9

acceptance thereof by the bank and the setting up
of the account.
Appellant relies heavily on Buhler vs. Maddison,
166 P.2d 205 (1946) in his brief, and cites a portion of the opinion. Following the decision ref erred
to by appellant, the Supreme Court of the State of
Utah granted a re-hearing of the case. As stated in
the subsequent decision found at 109 Ut. 267, 176
P.2d 118 ( 194 7) the Supreme Court of the State
of Utah stated:
"We granted a re-hearing and have reexamined the record and reconsidered the entire case."
The Buhler vs. Maddison case involved a workman's compensation claim. An injury occurred in
the State of Nevada, but as defendants resided in
the State of Utah, action was brought in the State
of Utah based upon the Nevada Workman's Compensation Act. The Court held that defendants were
nonaccepting employers under the Nevada Compensation Act.
The Nevada Compensation Act had a provision in it which stated as follows:
" ( 4) In actions by an employee against an
employer for personal injuries sustained, arising out of and in the course of the employment where the employer has rejected the
provisions of this act, it shall be presumed
that the injury to the employee was the first
result, and growing out of the negligence of
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the employer, and that such negligence was
the prm:imate cause of the injury; and in
such case the burden of proof shall rest upon
the employer to rebut the presumption of
negligence." Para. 2680, Sec. 1 (b), Nevada
Comp. L. 1931-41.
The Utah Supreme Court was confronted with the
question as to the effect and operation of the presumption of negligence and proxiniate cause established
by the Nevada Act. Defendant argued that such
pr€Sumption shifts only the burden of going forward
with the proof, and th2t once the employer has produced evidence to rebut the presumption of negligence, the presumption is sp2nt, and it drops out of
the picture. Plaintiffs argued that the presumption
sh if ts the burden of convincing th2 judge or jury on
the issue of negligsnce and prcximate cause, often
called the Burden of Pursuasion, and that instead
of such burden being upon the plaintiff as it usually is, defendant had tl1e burden, and that upon
proof of the employer employee relationship, of the
injury ai·ising out of and in the usual course of employment, and that the employer had not accepted
the act relative to insurance, that plaintiff is entitled
to a judgment as a matter of law unless the defendant shall produce evidence that the defendant was
not negligent; that in determining such question,
the presumption of negligence of the defendant remains as an element to be weighed with the other
evidence by the trier of fact.
The Utah Supreme Court in the Buhler vs. Mad11

dison case was concerned over whether or not the
presumption of negligence and proximate cause involved in the action were matters of substance, a
part of the cause of action, or were they merely
matters of procedure. If they were matters of substance, the Nevada law would clearly control. If
they were matters of procedure only, the law of the
State of Utah would control. The Court stated:
"In determining whether an element of
the cause of action is a matter of substance
or a procedure, the Court will examine the
statute or rule of law creating the claim, right
or duty, and the interpretations thereof by
the Courts of the state creating the right, or
where the ca use of action arose. If the requirement concerning proof of an element of a
cause of action exists in the lex loci, and if
such requirement is there interpreted as a
condition of the cause of action itself, the
Court of the forum would apply the rule of
the foreign state. This is so because "the remedial and substantive portions of the foreign
law are so bound together that the application of the usual procedural rules of the forum
would seriously alter the effect of the operative facts under the law of the foreign state."
The Supreme Court of the State of Utah held:
"It must follow therefor that the statutory presumption of negligence and proximate
cause are so closely allied and interwoven with
the cause of action itself that it cannot be separated therefrom without seriously impairing
the integrity of the cause of action. The law
of Nevada, lex loci, and not the law of Utah,
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lex fori must govern on the question as to
whether the jury could_ consider and weigh
the presumptwn of negligence along with the
other evidence on the question of defendants
negligence and proximate cause. The trial
Court applied the Nevada rule which was the
correct procedure."
The Supreme Court stated to the extent that
their prior opinion, that being the opinion cited by
appellant in this brief, is not in harmony with this
one, it is set aside.
The Idaho concept that where money in a joint
account is deposited by one party and thereafter a
question of the depositors intent arises, that the
party ascerting the right to the proceeds must prove
all of the elements of a gift, excepting irrevocable
delivery, by clear and convincing evidence is so interwoven with the substantial rights of the parties to
the bank account, that it cannot be separated therefrom without seriously impairing the integrity of
the cause of action based upon Idaho law. The law
of the State of Idaho, bx loci, would therefore necessarily be applicable to the issues in this case.
Appellant, in Point I of his argument, keeps
referring to the issue of constructive trust. While
plaintiffs did, as part of the relief prayed for in their
Complaint, seek the declaration of a constructive
trust over the proceeds obtained from the bank account by Bessie Monson, they also asked as separate
relief that they be awarded a money judgment
13

against defendant BEssie l\1onson. The trial Court
did not impose a const1 uctive trust on the proceeds,
but instead granted plaintiffs a judment against defendant without imposing a constructive trust. The
writer fails to see the niateriality of appellants references to constructive trust in Point I of his argument.
POINT II
UNDER IDAHO LAW DEFENDANT CLEARLY HAS
THE BURDEN OF GOING FORWARD WITH THE EVIDENCE AND PROVING ALL OF THE ELEMENTS OF A
GIFT, EXCEPTING IRREVOCABLE DELIVERY, BY CLEAR
AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE.

The State of Idaho within recent years has decided two cases bearing on this subject. The first
case is entitled Idaho First National Bank vs. First
National Bank of Caldwell and is found at 340 P.2d
1094 (1959). In this case a man by the name of
Griffiths, who was by profession an attorney at law,
created a joint account, naming his nephew, \Valter
Griffiths Jr., as a joint depositor thereon. Walter
Griffiths Sr. passed away, and defendant Walter
Griffiths Jr. claimed he was entitled to the funds
held in the joint bank account. The administrator
of the Estate of Walter Griffiths Sr., deceased,
brought action seeking to recover the funds previously held in the joint bank account so that they
might be distributed to the heirs pursuant to the
probate proceedings which had been initiated.
Judgment was entered in favor of the plaintiff anrl
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against the defendant, and defendant appealed to
the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho.
Idaho Supreme Court held:
"Where money in a joint account is deposited by one party, and thereafter a question of the depositor's intent arises, the party
asserting the gift must prove all the elements
of a gift, excepting irrevocable delivery, by
clear and convincing evidence. The question
of intent of decedent having been raised, defendants were required to assume the burden
of proof and to establish by clear and convincing evidence such elements of a gift."
In a more recent case entitled In Re Chase's
Estate, found at 348 P.2d 473, (1960) the Idaho
Supreme Court again had occasion to decide a case
concerning joint bank accounts and Idaho law pertaining to presumptions and burdens of proof. In
Re Chase's Estate concerns a situation in which one
of two joint depositors claimed to be entitled to funds
in a joint account following the death of the other
joint depositor. The Idaho Supreme Court In Re
Chase's Estate stated:
"The issue of Mr. Chase's intent in creating the accounts having been raised, the
question is whether respondent, by clear and
convincing evidence, proved a gift to her of
those bank accounts, completed upon the death
of decedent. VVith this in mind, we shall review the evidence."
15

POINT III
THE JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT IS CLEARLY
SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE.

Defendant Bessie Monson, although she had the
burden of proving all of the elements of a gift of
the bank account, excepting irrevocable delivery, by
clear and convincing evidence, failed to present any
evidence at all to prove that James Leon Woodward,
deceased, made a completed gift to her during his
lifetime. In fact, evidence clearly shows that she
did not receive a gift of the funds from James Leon
Woodward. There were no words of donative intent.
The only thing Jam es Leon Woodward told her durin his lifetime concerning said account was "Just
a minute, I have got a card out in the car I have
been carrying around and have forgot to have you
sign, I want you to put your signature on it so if
anything happens to me you can take care of my
burial expenses." No other conversation took place
between Bessie Monson, defendant-appellant and deceased Jam es Leon Woodward during his lifetime
concerning the joint account. ( T-68) James Leon
Woodward never told Bessie Monson she would be
entitled to retain the balance after paying burial
expenses.
Did James Leon W oodwa.rd assume that Bessie Monson, defendant-appellant would treat her
brothers and sisters, plaintiffs-respondents fairly
and distribute the balance of the proceeds evenly
among all of his sons and daughters fallowing the
16

payment of burial expenses? This we will never
know.
James Leon Woodward did not deliver possession of the bank pass book to Bessie Monson during
his lifetime. ( T-58, T-68) Bessie Monson made no
deposits or withdrawals from the bank account during the lifetime of James Leon Woodward. ( T-69)
He never told Bessie Monson that he gave her the
account or the money in it. (T-69) Bessie Monson
never considered the funds in the account were hers
until after the death of James Leon Woodward.
(T-75)
Following the death of James Leon Woodward,
Bessie Monson removed all the papers and documents
relating to the business transactions of James Leon
vVoodward and pertaining to the joint savings account from his personal residence in Preston, Idaho.
(T-129) Although she had all of the papers relating to the transaction involving the sale of the farm,
and well knew that the proceeds from the sale of
the farm had been placed in 2. joint bank account
with her, she attempted to conceal the funds from
her brothers and sisters. She denied to them that
she knew anything pertaining to the transaction involving the sale of the farm, at a time when she
not only knew the particulars of the farm transaction but had the papers pertaining to it in her possession. She denied she knew of the existence of
a bank account in which the proceeds from the sale
of the farm had been placed at times when she knew
17

the existence of the account, and in fact at times
after she had withdrawn ele funds and placed them
in her own account. (T-'10, T-88, T-1C9, T-130, T131) If Bessie Monson felt genuinely and hcnestly
entitled to the funds, why did she feel it necessary
to lie to her own brothers and sisters and attempt
to conceal the existence of the joint bank account?
POINT IV
IT IS THE DUTY OF THE SUPREl\IE COURT TO REVIEW THE EVIDENCE IN THE LIGHT MOST FAVORABLE
TO THE FINDINGS, AND THEY MUST BE ALLOWED TO
STAND IF REASONABLE MINDS COULD AGREE WITH
THEM.

The transcript of testimony in this case, as in
any case, contains merely the words spoken at trial.
It cannot contain inflections or tones of the voices
of the witnesses. The demeanor of the witnesses,
their apparent candor, or lack thereof, as gained
from their overall appearance in the Court room,
unfortunately, cannot be made a part of a transcript
of testimony. The trial Court sits in a position of
great advantage in that the trier of fact on the trial
Court level has the opportunity of observing the demeanor and other behavior of the witnesses, has the
advantage of hearing the inflections and tones of
the witnesses' voices. Much is conveyed beyond the
spoken word through voice inflection and other characteristics of a witness. This is especially so where
witnesses do not possess high degrees of education,
18

and hcwe takEn up lines of work which do not require
1·egula1· expressicn or comrnunicaticn, such 2s construction type work and the like. Very often the inflection and overall characteristics of a witness convey even more than their spoken words.
The Utah Supreme Court has pronounced its
duty to review the evidence in the light most favorable tc the findings of the trial Court 1 and stated
that thEy must be allowed to stand if reasonable
minds could agree with them on many occ2.sions.
Rather than citing all of the cases in which this
principal has been stated, we will simply refer to
Lawrence vs. Bamberger Railroad Company found
at 3 Ut. 2d 247, 282 P.2d 335 wherein the Supreme
Court of the State of Utah states:
"When the court has made findings and
entered juclment thereon as was done here, it
is then our duty to review the evidence in
the light most favorable to the findings, and
they must be allowed to stand if reasonable
minds could agree with them. Likewise every
1·easonable intendment ought to be indulged
in favor of the validity and correctness of
the judgment under review, and it will not
be disturbed unless the appellant meets his
burden of affirmatively showing error."
Appellant has failed to show that there is any
reason for disturbing the findings of the trial Court
in this case.
19

CONCLUSION
The judgment of the trial Court should be affirmed, and plaintiffs-respondents should be awarded costs.
Respectfully submitted,
MARK & SCHOENHALS
By --·------- -- -- -- -- ------------- -------- -------Robert E. Schoenhals
903 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
and Respondents.
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